Using Actual Financial Accounting Information To Conduct Financial Ratio Analysis:  The Case Of Motorola by Collier, Henry W. et al.
Journal of Business Case Studies – July/August 2010 Volume 6, Number 4 
23 
Using Actual Financial Accounting 
Information To Conduct Financial Ratio 
Analysis:  The Case Of Motorola 
Henry W. Collier, University of Wollongong, Australia 
Timothy Grai, Oakland University, USA 
Steve Haslitt, Oakland University, USA 
Carl B. McGowan, Jr., Norfolk State University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate the use of actual financial data for financial ratio analysis.  We 
construct a financial and industry analysis for Motorola Corporation.  The objective is to show 
students exactly how to compute ratios for an actual company.  This paper demonstrates the 
difficulties in applying the principles of financial ratio analysis when the data are not 
homogeneous, as is the case in textbook examples.  We use Motorola as an example because the 
firm has several segments, two of which account for the majority of sales and represent two 
industries (semi-conductor and communications) that have different characteristics.  The case 
illustrates the complexity of financial analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Motorola Segment Analysis 
 
otorola is a global manufacturer of communication products, semiconductors, and embedded electronic 
solutions.  The company is divided into six operating segments that publicly report financial results.  
Financial data are provided in Appendix A.  The Personal Communication Segment (PCS) designs, 
manufactures, and markets wireless communication products for service subscribers.  Products include wireless 
handsets, personal 2-way radios, and messaging devices, along with the associated accessories.  The Personal 
Communication Segment accounted for 37.8% of 2002 sales, making it the largest of Motorola’s operating 
segments.  The Global Telecommunications Segment (GTS) designs, manufactures, and markets the infrastructure 
communication systems purchased by telecommunication service providers.  Products include electronic exchanges, 
telephone switches, and base station controllers for various wireless communication standards.  This segment 
accounted for 15.8% of Motorola’s sales in 2002.  The Broadband Communication Segment (BCS) designs, 
manufactures, and markets a variety of products to support the cable and broadcast television and telephony 
industries in delivering high speed data, including cable modems, Internet-based telephones, set-top terminals, and 
digital satellite television systems.  This segment accounted for 7.3% of Motorola’s sales in 2002.  The Commercial, 
Government, & Industrial Segment (CGIS) designs, manufactures, and markets integrated communication systems 
for commercial, government, and industrial applications, typically private 2-way wireless networks for voice and 
data transmissions, such as would be used by public safety authorities in a community.  This segment accounted for 
13% of Motorola’s sales in 2002.  The Semiconductor Product Segment (SPS) designs, manufactures, and markets 
microprocessors and related semiconductors for use in various end products, such as computers, wireless and 
broadband devices, automobiles, and other consumer electronic devices.  Some of the semiconductors produced are 
used in products marketed by other Motorola segments.  This segment accounted for 16.8% of Motorola’s sales in 
2002.  The Integrated Electronic Systems Segment (IESS) designs, manufactures, and markets automotive and 
industrial electronic systems, single board computer systems, and energy storage products to support portable 
electronic devices (such as wireless handsets).  This segment accounted for 7.6% of Motorola’s sales in 2002. 
M 
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Total Motorola sales and profitability have varied widely over the last five years, as shown in Table 1.  
Sales peaked at over $37B in 2000 and dropped to less than $27B in 2002.  Motorola had a net loss in 2001 and 
2002.  Motorola’s stock price has varied from a high of over $55 in February of 2000 to a low price of less than $8 
in January of 2003.  Despite the losses incurred recently and the variability of reported income, Motorola has 
continued to pay a steady dividend of $0.16 per share since 1997.  This is a clear indication of the importance that 
Motorola attaches to the informational content associated with dividends; despite significant losses, dividends have 
not been reduced.  The most recent data indicates that Motorola has returned to profitability, posting a $0.01 per 
share profit for the first quarter of 2003. 
 
 
Table 1:  Condensed Statement of Financial Performance 1998 to 2002 
 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Sales 26,679 30,004 37,580 33,075 31,340 
Net Earnings (2,485) (3,937) 1,318 891 (907) 
Note: All figures in millions except per share data, as is typical in this report, unless noted. 
 
 
Industry Analysis 
 
The Telecommunications Equipment Industry 
 
The telecommunications equipment industry provides the products required to support land-based and 
wireless communications, both the end-consumer equipment and the infrastructure of the networks that enable the 
end-consumer products.  Data for companies in the telecommunications industry are shown in Appendix B.  Nokia 
is the market leader in the handset portion of this industry, followed by Motorola, Siemens and Sony-Ericsson.  
Ericsson leads the infrastructure portion of the equipment industry.  The five largest companies are Cisco Systems, 
Nokia, Qualcomm, Motorola, and Ericsson (yahoo.marketguide.com). 
 
The telecommunications equipment industry, in particular, has seen difficult operating conditions among 
the technology industries over the last several years.  The difficult operating conditions are the result of two 
underlying issues.  First, after a rapid build-up of wireless network infrastructure by the service providers (firms 
such as Verizon Wireless that provide telecommunication services to the end-consumer) in 2000, the demand for 
equipment by the service providers dropped some 15% in 2001 and likely dropped by even a higher percentage in 
2002 (Yahoo.finance).  Second, the demand for third generation (3G) wireless technologies (which includes mobile 
data services that can combine voice, data, email, PDA, and other features) has not evolved as quickly as expected.  
Wireless subscribers have chosen not to replace their handsets with the new 3G technologies in anticipation of the 
price of the equipment dropping (Yahoo.finance). 
 
The telecommunication equipment industry has a beta coefficient of 2.09, explaining, in part, the difficult 
operating conditions in the industry as a magnification of the poor conditions in the economy as a whole 
(yahoo.marketguide.com).  A key segment within the telecommunications industry is the wireless handset (cellular 
phone) segment, both because of its size and because of its visibility to end-consumers.  In this wireless handset 
segment, Nokia is the clear market leader, with a substantial 35.8% market share in 2002 and a strong presence in 
the critical European market.  This is important because Europe is where much of the technological innovation in the 
industry occurs.  Motorola is in second place in this industry segment with a market share of 15.3%, less than half of 
Nokia’s share.  Third place belongs to Samsung, with a 9.8% market share, but Samsung’s strong technology and 
significant resources pose significant challenges to Motorola and Nokia’s leadership positions.  Siemens held an 
8.4% market share in 2002, while the joint venture between Sony and Ericsson held a 5.5% market share in the 
industry segment (Reiter, 2003). 
 
The Semiconductor Industry 
 
The semiconductor industry provides the semiconductor “chips”, which are integral to consumer 
electronics, such as PC’s, PDA’s, audio, visual and entertainment equipment, and cellular phones.  Data for 
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companies in the semiconductor industry are shown in Appendix C.  These chips are also used in commercial 
electronics, such as network servers, communication switch equipment, and industrial controls.  Intel is the largest 
firm in the industry.  Intel is known, in particular, for supplying the microprocessors used in PC’s.  The top five 
companies in this industry, in order of descending market capitalization, are Intel, Texas Instrument, Taiwan 
Semiconductor, Advanced Materials, and ST-Microelectronics (yahoo.marketguide.com). 
 
The semiconductor industry experienced a record year in 2000 with worldwide sales of $200B.  Sales 
experienced a significant declined in 2001, down some 30% to $140B.  The decline in 2001 was attributed to weak 
sales in nearly every consumer electronics segment and to weak sales in commercial electronic segments, resulting 
in low demand for semiconductors (yahoo.finance).  The year 2002 brought only a slight recovery in the 
semiconductor industry, with an expected worldwide sales increase likely to be only several percentage points 
higher than 2001 levels.  November 2002 sales only increased by 1.3%, less than the 1.8% increase in October 2002.  
This low increase is significant because November sales have historically averaged larger increases as electronic 
manufacturers prepare for the holiday season (Value Line, January 17, 2003, p 1051).  The semiconductor industry 
has a Beta coefficient of 2.17, which, like the telecommunication equipment industry, explains, in part, the severe 
downturn in the industry as the entire economy took a downturn over the last several years 
(yahoo.marketguide.com). 
 
Financial Ratio Analysis 
 
Financial ratios for Motorola, for the semiconductor industry, and for the telecommunications industry are 
provided in Table 2.  The firms in the semiconductor industry subset represent 87% of the estimated total 
semiconductor industry sales of $100 billion in 2002 (Value Line, January 3, 2003, pp. 744 and pp. 770).  The firm’s 
telecommunications equipment industry represented 91% of telecommunication equipment industry sales of $277 
billion in 2002 (Value Line, January 17, 2003, p 1051). 
 
 
Table 2:  2002 Ratio Analysis 
 Motorola 
Semiconductor 
Industry 
Telecommunication 
Equipment Industry 
Current Ratio 1.77 2.44 1.52 
Quick Ratio 1.47 2.08 1.23 
Average Collection Period 61 days 50 days 73 days 
Inventory Turnover 6.25 6.01 5.66 
Fixed Asset Turnover 4.37 1.58 6.24 
Total Asset Turnover 0.86 0.61 0.90 
Debt Ratio 0.64 0.34 0.65 
Debt to Equity Ratio 1.77 0.52 1.82 
Times Interest Earned NA NA NA 
Gross Profit Margin 32.76% 37.49% 29.52% 
Net Profit Margin -9.31% -3.00% -1.24% 
Return on Investment -7.98% -1.82% -1.11% 
Return on Equity -22.11% -2.78% -3.14% 
Assets / Equity 2.77 1.52 2.82 
Note:  Ratios are derived from the data in Appendices A, B, and C. 
 
 
Evaluating Motorola relative to the semiconductor industry, we first note that Motorola is slightly less 
liquid than the average firm in the industry, with both a current ratio and a quick ratio that is lower than the industry 
average.  Motorola’s average collection period, at 61 days, is lower than the industry average of 50 days, indicating 
Motorola should evaluate its credit policies.  Both fixed asset turnover and total asset turnover are above the 
semiconductor industry averages, indicating that Motorola is using its assets more efficiently than the industry 
average in generating sales.  Motorola’s debt ratio and debt-to-equity ratio indicate that Motorola is more leveraged 
than the average firm in the industry.  This higher leverage, in part, explains Motorola’s poor financial performance 
relative to the semiconductor industry because the leverage commits Motorola to interest payments that must be paid 
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regardless of economic and market conditions.  The ratios indicate that Motorola has a higher cost of sales than the 
average firm in the semiconductor industry, resulting in a lower gross profit margin and higher indirect costs, 
resulting in lower net profit margin performance relative to the semiconductor industry. 
 
The situation is different when evaluating Motorola relative to the telecommunications equipment industry 
and, considering that the majority of Motorola’s business is in this industry rather than the semiconductor industry, 
this is the more interesting and relevant story.  Relative to the telecommunications equipment industry, Motorola has 
a better liquidity position, with both the current ratio and the quick ratio being higher than the industry average.  
Motorola collects receivables quicker than the average firm in this industry.  Relative to this industry, Motorola may 
want to evaluate credit policies to determine if perhaps strict credit policies are negatively impacting sales.  
Motorola uses its total assets slightly less efficiently than the average firm in the telecommunications equipment 
industry and its fixed asset turnover is significantly less than the industry average, at 4.37 compared to the industry 
average of 6.24.  Motorola is more highly leveraged than the average firm in the telecommunications industry.  
Motorola may want to examine its capital structure policy to ensure it has the right balance of benefit from the tax 
shield of increased debt relative to the bankruptcy and related financial distress costs associated with increased debt. 
 
Several explanations are possible for the deviation from industry norms.  Perhaps this is the result of a 
conscious choice to invest heavily in technology and automation in its manufacturing processes (as opposed to a 
more labor-intensive manufacturing strategy).  While such fixed investments will yield significant gains in good 
market conditions, the investments commit the firm to fixed costs (depreciation), even in bad economic conditions.  
Alternatively, the poor fixed asset turnover may indicate overcapacity caused by extremely poor forecasts of future 
sales. Or, the poor ratio may indicate a fundamental inability or inefficiency in using the deployed assets.  Motorola 
is slightly less leveraged, with a lower debt and debt-to-equity ratio.  Keep in mind, though, that the debt ratios used 
in the ratio analysis above used total liabilities as a measure of debt.  In contrast, capital structure analysis focuses 
specifically on long-term debt in calculating leverage. 
 
Motorola has a higher gross profit margin than the average firm in the telecommunications equipment 
industry (32.8% versus 29.5%), but has a lower net margin.   Motorola has a higher fixed and indirect cost structure.  
As an illustration of the potential fixed and indirect cost issues, consider the productivity, which for this purpose is 
defined as sales per employee, of Motorola relative to its chief competitor in the telecommunications equipment 
industry - Nokia.  In 2001, Motorola generated sales of $31,191M with 111,000 employees for a productivity of 
$0.27M per employee.  In contrast, Nokia generated sales of $27,645M with just 53,800 employees, for a 
productivity of $0.53M per employee - nearly double the productivity of Motorola.  Clearly, Motorola has 
significant costs associated with its level of employment that are not being returned in sales.  This is interesting 
because Motorola, as observed earlier, also has poor fixed asset use in addition to this effective and/or efficient use 
of human assets.   Perhaps contributing to the poor fixed and indirect cost structure is that Motorola has elements of 
being a conglomerate that most of the other firms in the industry do not have.  Motorola is involved in diverse 
business segments – telecommunications, semiconductors, automotive components, and batteries, to name a few – 
and must evaluate whether the administrative and infrastructure costs of managing these diverse segments are less 
than the benefits of having the segments under one corporate umbrella.  It is not obvious that the diverse business 
segments within Motorola are being used synergistically to increase overall value. If there are not synergies between 
the business segments, Motorola shareholders should prefer that Motorola divest the segments as investors can 
diversify their portfolios more efficiently than Motorola can.  Most of the other firms in the industry do not have to 
absorb the costs associated with managing such diverse business activities. 
 
DuPont System of Financial Analysis 
 
A DuPont analysis of Motorola, the semiconductor industry, and the telecommunications equipment 
industry is shown in Table 3.  The story told by the DuPont analysis is similar to the story told by analyzing ratios; 
i.e., Motorola must focus on controlling operating costs.  Relative to the semiconductor industry as a whole, 
Motorola has an advantage in its leverage ratio (Assets to Equity of 2.77 compared to 1.52 for the industry) and in 
its use of assets (Total Asset Turnover of 0.86 compared to 0.61), yet has a poorer return on equity due to its low net 
profit margin.  While one would expect a somewhat lower net profit margin for a firm with a higher leverage ratio 
(the firm has to pay interest to service the debt that gives the higher leverage ratio), in the Motorola case there are 
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apparently other operational inefficiencies impacting the net profit margin because the overall return on equity is 
less than the industry average.  A similar story, though not quite as obvious, is told by comparing Motorola to the 
telecommunications equipment industry averages for the DuPont analysis, where Motorola again stands out as being 
deficient in its ability to generate profits from its sales. 
 
 
Table 3:  The DuPont Analysis of Motorola and Industries 
 Motorola Semiconductor Industry 
Telecommunication 
Equipment Industry 
ROE (Return on Equity) -22.11% -2.78% -3.14% 
= = = = 
NPM (Net Profit Margin) -9.31% -3.00% -1.24% 
X X X X 
TAT (Total Asset Turnover) 0.86 0.61 0.90 
X X X X 
A/E (Assets/Equity) 2.77 1.52 2.82 
 
 
Figure 1:  ROA Analysis for Motorola - 2002 
Sales
Gross 26,679
Margin
8,741 -
COGS
17,938
Net Profit
(2,485) - Variable
Expenses
NPM 7,957
-9.3% / Expenses +
11,226 Fixed
Sales Expenses
26,679 3,269
ROA
-8.0% X
Inventory
2,869
Sales +
26,679 Current Accounts
Assets Receivable
TAT 17,134 4,437
0.86 / +
Other
Total Assets Current
31,152 + Assets
9,828
Fixed
Assets
14,018
ROA Analysis
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the Return on Asset (ROA) portion of the DuPont analysis 
 
ROE = NPM * TAT * A/E = ROA * A/E (1) 
 
and helps to illustrate Motorola’s situation.  Large variable and fixed expenses (relative to the level of sales) are 
negatively impacting ROA, and these expenses, especially variable expenses (selling, general, and administrative 
expenses) since they are perceived to be more easily controllable, need to be closely evaluated.  Increases in sales 
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revenues may also help the ROA situation.  Although poor overall market conditions can be blamed for a portion of 
Motorola’s low sales figure, Motorola also needs to critically evaluate why it has lost market share in some of its 
key business areas over the last several years (for example, Nokia’s and Samsungs market share in wireless handsets 
has improved while Motorola’s has declined) making the operating results from poor market conditions even worse.  
The impact of Motorola’s decision early in the lifecycle of the cellular industry not to participate in developing 
digital cellular technology likely opened the door for firms such as Nokia to gain significant market positions, and 
Motorola’s sales – and its financial position - still suffer from this decision.  New product development investments 
must be closely evaluated to assure that Motorola is developing products that will be valued in the marketplace.  
However, competitors will not simply let Motorola gain sales and market share at their expense.  Nokia capitalized 
on Motorola’s incorrect earlier strategic decision to forego entry in the digital wireless handset arena. Nokia gained 
a dominant position in Europe and is now clearly aiming to challenge Motorola’s leadership in CDMA wireless 
handset technology in the United States through the introduction of multiple new handset models based on the 
CDMA technology prevalent in America (Nokia Unveils New Phones to Crack CDMA).   Motorola and Nokia are 
also losing share in foreign markets, such as China, because domestic firms in those markets use price advantages to 
drive sales (Nokia, Motorola Lose China Market Share to Domestic Companies).  Motorola must develop a product 
and business strategy to increase sales in the midst of these threats, while at the same time controlling variable and 
fixed expenses. 
 
Short Term Liquidity Management 
 
As shown in Table 4, the telecommunication equipment industry averages a current ratio of 1.52 and a 
quick ratio of 1.23, so Motorola’s current ratio and quick ratio of 1.77 and 1.47, respectively, compares favorably to 
the industry.  This, combined with the observation that both ratios are above one, leads to the conclusion that 
Motorola is in a solid short-term liquidity position.  While this favorable absolute liquidity position is important, 
perhaps just as important to debt investors in Motorola is the trend over time in the ratios.  In Motorola’s case, there 
have been very solid improvements in its liquidity position since 1999 and 2000.  Some of this improvement in 
liquidity comes from reductions in notes payable and the current portion of long-term debt.  But a significant portion 
of the improvement is attributable to large increases in cash and cash equivalents.  The cash and cash equivalent 
balance increased 97% percent during period.  In addition to the cash increases seen above. Motorola has very 
recently taken additional steps to “further boost” its cash position by selling $325M of Nextel stock (Motorola Sells 
$325M of Nextel Stock).  This sale of 25 million of Motorola’s 108 million Nextel shares was completed “to realize 
the price appreciation of some of its investment in the wireless communications services provider and to enhance its 
already strong cash position” (Motorola Completes Sale of 25 Million of Its 108 Million Shares of Nextel).   After 
the sale, Motorola will remain one of Nextel’s largest shareholders, retaining over a 9% stake in Nextel (Motorola 
Sells $325M of Nextel Stock). 
 
 
Table 4:  Short-term Liquidity Analysis 
 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Cash and cash equivalents 6,507 6,082 3,301 3,537 
Short-term investments 59 80 354 699 
Accounts receivable, net 4,437 4,583 7,092 5,627 
Inventories, net 2,869 2,756 5,242 3,707 
Other current assets 3,262 3,648 3,896 4,015 
    Total current assets 17,134 17,149 19,885 17,585 
     
Notes payable & current portion of long-term debt 1,524 870 6,391 2,504 
Accounts payable 2,268 2,434 3,492 3,285 
Accrued liabilities 5,913 6,394 6,374 7,117 
    Total current liabilities 9,705 9,698 16,257 12,906 
     
Current Ratio 1.77 1.77 1.22 1.36 
Quick Ratio 1.47 1.48 0.90 1.08 
Net Working Capital 7,429 7,451 3,628 4,679 
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Capital Structure & Debt Management 
 
From Table 5, it is evident that there has been a significant change in Motorola’s capital structure over the 
last several years.  When viewed from either a book value or market value basis, there is a significant increase in 
leverage.  Motorola’s long-term debt increased by more than 85% from 2000 to 2001, while equity dropped on both 
a book value and market value basis.  From the data, it does not appear that Motorola has a strict or a tight target 
debt-equity ratio that they maintain to balance the benefits of debt (primarily, the tax savings due to interest) with 
the cost of debt (primarily, financial distress costs), unlike many large firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001).  It is 
unclear whether Motorola has a strategy to minimize their weighted average cost of capital.   
 
 
Table 5:  Financial Leverage Analysis for Motorola 
 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Long Term Debt, Book Value ($M) 7,779 8,857 4,778 3,573 
Long Term Debt, Market Value ($M) 7,722 8,857 4,778 3,573 
Stockholders Equity, Book Value ($M) 11,239 13,691 18,612 18,693 
# Shares (M) 2,301 2,213 2,257 2,202 
Share Price ($) 8.01 16.05 19.59 44.72 
Stockholders Equity, Market Value ($M) 18,431 35,523 44,207 98,473 
     
Debt/Equity (Book Value) 0.69 0.65 0.26 0.19 
Debt/Equity (Market Value) 0.42 0.25 0.11 0.04 
Note: 2001, 2000, 1999 market value of debt is assumed to be the same as book value of debt. 
 
 
Some of the increase in long-term debt from 2000 to 2001 was used to replace short-term debt (Motorola 
2001 Proxy Statement).   However, we observed earlier that cash balances increased significantly in the same time 
period, indicating that some of the long-term financing was used to improve the short-term liquidity position.  But 
these improvements in the short-term liquidity position came at the expense of an increase in operating risk. The 
increased leverage committed the company to increase interest payments to service the long-term debt.  Interest 
payments increased from $529M to $844M from 2000 to 2001, increasing Motorola’s losses in 2001 as economic 
and market conditions worsened (Motorola 2001 Proxy Statement).  The significant amount of debt added in 2001 
could also impact Motorola’s ability to acquire long-term debt at favorable rates in the future.  If funds are needed 
beyond what are available internally, Motorola may have no choice but to turn to the equity market, which is 
generally considered to be unfavorable at this point in time.  The increase in long-term debt may, in part, support the 
free cash flow hypothesis, which asserts that bad investment decisions are often made in the presence of a large 
amount of free cash flow. 
 
While we have examined Motorola’s capital structure from an absolute perspective, it is worthwhile to look 
at the capital structure relative to the industry segment that Motorola primarily participates in - the 
telecommunications equipment industry.  Company-wide financial structure data are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6:  Financial Leverage Analysis for Industry 
 Industry 
Long Term Debt, Book Value ($M) 56,347 
Stockholders Equity, Book Value ($M) 119,349 
Stockholders Equity, Market Value ($M) 270,389 
  
Debt/Equity (Book Value) 0.47 
Debt/Equity (Market Value) 0.21 
 
 
In Table 5, Motorola’s debt-equity ratio, on a book value basis, is 0.69, which is higher than the industry 
average of 0.42, from in Table 6 and Motorola’s debt-equity ratio on a market value basis is 0.47, double the 
industry average of 0.21.  So, Motorola has not only increased its leverage, it has increased its leverage well above 
the industry average leverage ratio.  Is this bad in the sense that the higher leverage level is detracting from firm 
value?  We believe that this question is difficult to answer with information from publicly available sources. The 
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appropriate amount of leverage is unique to each firm based on the firm balancing the tax benefits of increased debt 
against the financial distress costs associated with increased debt.  However, the deviation from the industry average 
leverage ratio should be closely examined as, on average, other firms in similar business situations see the 
appropriate balance between the tax shelter benefit and distress costs at much lower levels of leverage. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate that financial ratio analysis using data for an actual company – Motorola - 
and industry - telecommunications and semiconductor - is complicated and is further complicated for companies that 
do not readily fall into a single industry.  Motorola has six operating units that fall into several industries with two 
industries accounting for most of the sales – telecommunications and semi-conductor.  The differences in the 
industry characteristics of these two industries complicate the financial ratio analysis of Motorola.  However, a more 
relevant picture of the operating characteristics of Motorola is achieved by increasing the complexity of the analysis; 
that is, by comparing Motorola to both industries. 
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APPENDIX A                   
Motorola          
Segment Sales and Earnings             
  2002 2001  
Segment Sales %Sales OE OM Sales %Sales OE %OE d(Sales) 
PCS 10847 37.8% 804 7.4% 10436 33.2% -318 -3.0% 3.9% 
SPS 4818 16.8% -283 -5.9% 4936 15.7% -1000 -20.3% -2.4% 
GTSS 4540 15.8% -11 -0.2% 6442 20.5% 32 0.5% -29.5% 
CGISS 3729 13.0% 361 9.7% 3850 12.3% 350 9.1% -3.1% 
BCS 2087 7.3% 257 12.3% 2854 9.1% 450 15.8% -26.9% 
IESS 2189 7.6% 115 5.3% 2239 7.1% -12 -0.5% -2.2% 
OPS 486 1.7% -267 -54.9% 658 2.1% -212 -32.2% -26.1% 
Total 28696 100.0% 976  31415 100.0% -710  -8.7% 
          
OE Operating Earnings             
OM Operating Margin             
PCS Personal Communications Segment           
SPS Semiconductor Products Segment       
GTSS Global Telecom Solutions Segment       
CGISS Commercial, Government, and Industrial Solutions Segment    
BCS Broadband Communications Segment      
IESS Integrated Electronic Systems Segment      
OPS Other Products Segment             
 
 
APPENDIX B            
Motorola            
Telecommunications Industry           
  Alcatel Cisco Ericcson- Lucent NEC Nortel Nokia Qualcomm Siemens Motorloa Tele 
    Sony   Networks     Comm 
  ALA CSCO EDICY Lucent NIPNY NT NOK QCOM  MOT Industry 
Assets            
Accts Receivable 14956 1105 2923 1647 7737 2923 6143 925 16358 4437 59154 
Inventory 4681 880 6741 1363 5366 1579 1920 88 11462 2869 36950 
Current Assets 24650 17433 22926 7629 19854 11762 16664 4384 47325 17134 189760 
Net Fixed Assets 4202 4102 1887 3503 9206 2571 2700 686 12612 6104 47573 
Total Assets 36549 37795 29345 17791 41365 21137 24088 6510 83711 31152 329443 
Liabilities            
Current Liabilities 15547 8375 10754 6326 16148 9611 10275 675 37283 9705 124698 
Long Term Debt 5879 0 6118 4986 15013 4094 304 94 11002 8857 56347 
Total Liabilities 26700 9124 20882 20845 29451 15676 11015 1073 57867 19913 212546 
Shareholder Equity 9849 28671 8464 -3054 11914 5461 13074 5437 25844 11239 116897 
L&SE 36549 37795 29345 17791 41365 21137 24088 6510 83711 31152 329443 
Revenues 25353 18915 27208 12321 42109 17511 33501 3040 90238 26679 296874 
COGS 19074 6902 20408 10769 32287 14167 21252 1137 65314 17938 209248 
Gross Profit 6279 12013 6799 1552 9822 3344 12249 1902 24925 8741 87626 
Interest   679 382 2060 311 167 26 101 356 4081 
Taxes -1261  -1034 4757 -1231 -3252 1280 101 912 -961 -689 
Net Income -4963  -2495 11753 -2576 -8414 2363 360 2789 -2485 -3668 
Price 7 13 6 2 3 2 13 34 39 8  
Shares Outstanding (M) 1260 7110 1660 3910 1650 3850 4790 789 888 2301  
Market Capitalization 8253 92501 6100 6100 5726 7970 60689 27012 34329 18431 270389 
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APPENDIX C                               
Motorola                 
Semi-Conductor Industry Data               
  Advance Analog Atmel Fairchild Intel Maxim Micron National NVIDIA ST Staiwan Texas Inst XILINK Motorola MOT Semi 
  Micro Devices      Semi  Micro Semi Instrument   Conductor 
  AMD ADI ATML FCS INTC MXIM MU  NVDA STM TSM TXN XLNX MOT Industry 
                 
Assets                
Accts Receivable 660 218 187 134 2607 130 538 132 147 902 571 1198 148 4437 12008 
Inventory 381 247 302 209 2253 139 545 145 214 743 281 751 79 2869 9157 
Current Assets 2353 3435 1189 875 17633 1236 2119 1073 1234 4558 2024 5775 999 17134 61636 
Net Fixed Assets 2739 908 1652 660 18121 746 4700 737 120 5888 7183 5589 450 6104 55596 
Total Assets 5647 4885 3024 2149 44395 2011 7555 2289 1503 10798 11262 15779 2335 31152 144784 
                 
Liabilities                
Current Liabilities 1314 528 735 199 6570 229 753 404 434 1687 953 1580 196 9705 25286 
Total Liabilities 2092 2042 1538 1341 8565 270 1189 508 739 4687 2617 3900 432 19913 49831 
Shareholder 
Equity 
3555 2843 1487 808 35830 1741 6367 1781 764 6111 8645 11879 1904 11239 94953 
L&SE 5647 4885 3024 2149 44395 2011 7555 2289 1503 10798 11262 15779 2335 31152 144784 
                 
Revenues 3892 2277 1472 1408 26539 1025 2589 1495 1370 6357 3675 8201 1016 26679 87993 
COGS 2590 1008 1058 1054 13487 312 2700 941 850 4047 2636 5824 558 17938 55003 
Gross Profit 1302 1269 415 354 13052 713 -111 553 519 2310 1039 2377 458 8741 32991 
Interest 61 63 57 104   17  16 13 90 61 0 356 838 
Taxes -15 151 -113 -22 892 128 -92 -2 76 61 -107 -225 -79 -961 -308 
Net Income -61 356 -418 -42 1291 259 -907 -122 177 257 -628 -201 -114 -2485 -2637 
Price 4.94 23.4 2.01 10.55 15.43 30.75 8.16 13 10.03 17.65  15.46 18.76 8.01  
